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1. See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument
for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 544 (2006)
(arguing that the public is less concerned about undercompensation when the government proposes
to use a condemnee’s land for a traditional public use); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin,
Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 866 (arguing that true public uses provide the
condemnee with “some amount of implicit compensation”).
2. See infra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
3. Now that you have realized that the government needs your property for the development
to go forward, you want to get a “monopoly price” by holding out. See infra notes 205–07, 211 and
accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 126–36 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 173–84, 186–89 and accompanying text.
C. Eliminate the Ambiguity in the Florida Constitution.. . . . . 502
D. Decrease Abuse of Police Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503
 VI. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503
I.  INTRODUCTION
A knock at your front door wakes you. Blurry-eyed, you open your
door to a government official who tells you that the city would like to
purchase your home for a price slightly greater than fair market value.
According to the official, most of your neighbors have already agreed to
sell their homes so that your “distressed” neighborhood can get an
economic facelift, which will include a multi-tower condominium
complex. While you briefly consider selling, you are bothered that the
government will not put your property to what you deem a traditional
public use.  Quickly remembering that your state representative helped1
pass eminent domain reform in Florida last year,  you smile and say that2
you will not sell your home (which is worth around $100,000) for less than
$1 million.  The government official refuses and promises to contact you3
in the future.
Six months later, you regret having turned away the official. Although
you were happy when the city increased fire and police protection and
repaved some roads in your neighborhood, the special assessments
imposed on you from those projects  have exponentially increased your4
property tax bill. Along with higher bills, you have repeatedly received
government notices demanding that you comply with building permit
restrictions and fill out paperwork to prevent the city from demolishing the
porch that you are constructing.  Additionally, although you knew of some5
drug dealing nearby, now the police catch a drug dealer in your
neighborhood every few weeks, sometimes through controlled buys in
your front yard. The city has warned you that you must take measures to
abate this drug-related “public nuisance.”6
2
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7. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 173–84 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 46–53 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6 (“No private property shall be taken except for a public
purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the
registry of the court and available to the owner.”).
14. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Indeed, “Kelo remains a popular punching bag in the media.”
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412,
1415 (2006); accord Robert C.L. Moffat, “Not the Law’s Business:” The Politics of Tolerance and
the Enforcement of Morality, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1097, 1120 (2005) (noting the widespread backlash
to the Kelo decision).
15. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90.
16. Id. at 472, 490.
17. Florida Governor “Jeb Bush called the [Kelo] decision ‘horrible’” and urged quick state
action. Carrie Johnson, Property Ruling Appalls Officials, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 25, 2005,
at 1B. The Alabama Senate reacted first, prohibiting local governments from using eminent domain
for private development or to increase tax revenue. CASTLE COAL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, LEGISLATIVE
ACTION SINCE KELO 2 (2006), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/legislation/state%
Not surprisingly, when the government official again shows up at your
door, you decide to “voluntarily” sell your home for slightly more than
$100,000. If you had not sold, the government might have either seized
your property for your failure to pay the increased taxes  or condemned7
your property for failure to abate the nuisance.8
Although this hypothetical paints a drastic scenario, the government’s
current means likely are not any friendlier to the landowner than those that
most people viewed as the “horrors” that occurred when the government
used eminent domain for economic redevelopment. Before eminent
domain was reformed in Florida,  the government still attempted to9
negotiate a voluntary sale.  If refused, the government had to follow the10
necessary eminent domain procedures,  to demonstrate that the proposed11
project qualified as a “public use,”  and ultimately to pay “just12
compensation.”  Still, the fear and perception that landowners were given13
unjust compensation and that corrupt officials were abusing eminent
domain to yield only private benefits has driven a harsh reaction to the
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 ruling in Kelo v. City of New London.  In14
Kelo, the Court upheld New London’s use of eminent domain to acquire
land for a private development project.  The Court reasoned that the15
project’s promise to create jobs, increase tax revenues, and revitalize an
economically distressed area resulted in a constitutional “public use.”16
After Kelo, legislators across the country worried that “economic
redevelopment” would become a blanket justification for eminent
domain.  Florida legislators acted quickly.  One day after Kelo was17 18
3
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20legislative%20summary%2008-03-06.pdf. Georgia passed legislation that narrowed the
definition of “blight” for condemnation purposes and declared that economic development was not
a “public use.” Id. at 4. Within one year of Kelo, twenty-nine of the forty-five states that had 2006
legislative sessions, including Florida, passed eminent domain reform. Id. at 1.
18. The Kelo Court indicated “that nothing in [its] opinion precludes any State from placing
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. Florida was one of
many states to react quickly to the decision. See supra note 17.
19. Kelo was decided on June 23, 2005. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469. On June 24, 2005, Allan
Bense, the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, announced that he was “immediately
appointing a select committee of the Florida House of Representatives . . . to identify any areas of
ambiguity and recommend appropriate changes to make sure the unfortunate situation . . . seen in
Connecticut is not repeated in the state of Florida.” Press Release, Fla. House of Representatives,
Speaker Appointing Select Committee to Protect Private Property Rights (June 24, 2005), available
at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?DocumentType=Press%20
Release&FileName=64.
20. See Press Release, Fla. House of Representatives, Speaker Appoints Members of Select
Committee to Protect Private Property Rights (July 15, 2005), available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/HouseNews/preview.aspx?PressReleaseId=66.
21. See H.B. 1567, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (creating FLA. STAT. §§ 73.013,
73.014, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 73.021, 127.01, 127.02, 163.335, 163.340, 163.345, 163.358,
163.370, 163.380, 166.401, 166.411, and repealing FLA. STAT. § 163.375). The bill passed on May
4, 2006, and became law on May 11, 2006. Id. It generally prohibits the transfer of property taken
by eminent domain, with some enumerated exceptions, to another private entity within ten years
of the taking. See FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (2007). Additionally, the bill prohibits the use of eminent
domain to eliminate “blight” or “slum” conditions or to eliminate public nuisances. See id.
§ 73.014.
22. See H.R.J. Res. 1569, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (codified at FLA. CONST. art. X,
§ 6). The Florida Constitution now includes the following provision: “Private property taken by
eminent domain pursuant to a petition to initiate condemnation proceedings . . . may not be
conveyed to a natural person or private entity except as provided by general law passed by a three-
fifths vote of the membership of each house of the Legislature.” FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
23. Les Christie, Kelo’s Revenge: Voters Restrict Eminent Domain, CNNMONEY.COM, Nov.
8, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/ 08/real_estate/kelos_revenge/index.htm (reporting that
69% of Florida voters passed the amendment). The passage of the amendment, or other ballot
provisions for that matter, is not surprising. See Ballotwatch, Complete State-by-State Election
R es u l t s  (BW 200 4 - 1 0 )  an d  E le ct i o n  R es u l t s  2 0 0 6  (B W 2 0 0 6 - 5 ) ,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/ballotwatch.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (reporting that 67% of
all state ballot propositions were approved by voters in both the 2004 and 2006 elections).
decided, Florida’s House of Representatives created the House Select
Committee to Protect Private Property Rights.  The committee was19
created to prevent Kelo’s perceived horrors by setting clear guidelines to
allow eminent domain only where there is a clear public necessity and
benefit.  After passing a bill intended to limit abuses of eminent domain,20 21
the Florida Legislature crafted a constitutional amendment to place before
voters in a statewide referendum.  Voters overwhelmingly passed this22
amendment on November 7, 2006.  Florida’s current framework requires23
the government to wait ten years before transferring to a private entity
private property taken by eminent domain and forbids the use of eminent
4
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24. See supra note 21.
25. See supra note 22.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra note 31.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part V.
31. See Castle Coal., The Polls Are In, http://www.castlecoalition.org/resources/kelo_polls.
html (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (listing post-Kelo public opinion polls that indicate negative
reactions to the decision); see also Theodore C. Taub, Workshop, Post-Kelo: Emerging Impacts
and Issues in Eminent Domain (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Aug. 17–19, 2006), WL SM004 ALI-
ABA 1721, 1772 (“Kelo shook the American people out of their malaise concerning the extent of
the governmental eminent domain power. Overwhelmingly, America’s reaction to this power has
been negative in the extreme, mainly due to the oversimplifications and exaggerations of
alarmists.”). One poll indicated that 88% of Floridians disagreed with the Kelo ruling and 89%
supported legislation increasing property protections. Florida Voters Favor Eminent Domain
Restrictions, JACKSONVILLE BUS. J., Nov. 8, 2005, http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/
stories/2005/11/07/daily12.html.
32. Florida House Speaker Bense remarked that the legislature created the House Select
Committee to Protect Private Property Rights out of concern arising from the Kelo decision. See
Press Release, Fla. House of Representatives, supra note 19. It is worth noting that local
domain to eliminate “blight” conditions or public nuisances.24
Additionally, the Florida Constitution requires a three-fifths majority in
both legislative houses to grant exceptions to the eminent domain
prohibitions on private use.25
This Note initially discusses how the Florida Legislature’s reaction to
Kelo was unnecessary.  However, accepting that the legislature felt the26
influence of the body politic to enact significant eminent domain reform,27
this Note argues that the legislature did not fully consider the
consequences of its actions. Instead, the legislature’s measures were overly
broad and created ambiguity.  Additionally, the measures will have28
unintended consequences that could leave landowners and the community
worse off than under the previous system.  Finally, this Note offers29
solutions that would both provide Florida with a more comprehensive
eminent domain framework and capture the Florida Legislature’s actual
intent to curb abuse and provide opportunities that benefit the public.30
II.  LEGISLATION WAS UNNECESSARY TO REACH THE DESIRED
CONCLUSION
A.  Existing Law Did Not Allow Takings for Economic Development
In the midst of strong public opinion against the Kelo decision,  the31
Florida Legislature did not adequately analyze existing state case law to
determine if a situation like the one addressed in Kelo could happen in
Florida.  Many state courts before and after Kelo had, without relying on32
5
Kennelly: In Honor of Walter O. Weyrach: Florida's Eminent Domain Overhaul:
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
476 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
governments wishing to exercise eminent domain would have had to adhere to Florida’s more strict
state law rather than the federal standard. See Johnson, supra note 17.
33. See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 494–95 (Ark. 1967) (holding
invalid a taking for the benefit of private industries because industrial development did not
constitute a “public use”); City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 7–8 (Ky. 1979)
(holding invalid a statute granting the government the right to condemn private property for private
industrial and commercial development under the state constitution’s “public use” clause); Merrill
v. City of Manchester, 499 A.2d 216, 217–18 (N.H. 1985) (holding invalid a taking for industrial
development under the state constitution’s narrow “public use” clause); Karesh v. City Council, 247
S.E.2d 342, 344–45 (S.C. 1978) (holding invalid a taking of land for lease to a private developer
based on the state constitution’s narrow view of “public use”); In re City of Seattle, 638 P.2d 549,
559–60 (Wash. 1981) (holding that the state constitution’s “public use” clause prohibited the taking
of private property for commercial development); see also infra notes 39–41 and accompanying
text.
34. Francesca Jarosz, Before You Grab That Property, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 37,
38.
35. 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006).
36. Id. at 1124–26.
37. Id. at 1125.
38. Id. at 1142, 1146.
39. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 775–76, 784 (Mich. 2004) (holding
that while job creation and increasing tax revenues were goals that advance a “public purpose,”
constructing a private business and technology park did not justify a taking because the privately
owned structures did not constitute a “public use” under the state constitution).
40. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 649–50 (Okla. 2006) (invalidating
a proposed taking for a pipeline that would benefit a private entity and enable economic
development because there was not a “public purpose” as required by the state constitution).
41. See In re Redevelopment Auth., 891 A.2d 820, 830–31 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (noting
that although the taking of private property to build a private religious school was invalidated by
the Establishment Clause, Kelo-type takings are also prohibited by the state constitution’s “public
use” requirement), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 36 EAP 2006, 2007 WL 4555540 (Pa. Dec. 27,
2007). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently reversed, finding that the taking did not
violate the Establishment Clause and citing Kelo in holding that the exercise of eminent domain
to eliminate blight is proper. In re Redevelopment Auth., 2007 WL 4555540, at *6.
reactionary statutes or constitutional amendments, held that economic
redevelopment could in itself justify the use of eminent domain.  In fact,33
the first state supreme court to rule in an eminent domain case after Kelo
invalidated the challenged taking for this reason.  34
In City of Norwood v. Horney,  the City of Norwood planned to use35
eminent domain to take several properties and then turn them over to a
private developer.  The city justified the takings on the basis of economic36
benefit to the city and a study that found that the area was
“deteriorating.”  The Ohio Supreme Court invalidated the forward-37
looking “deteriorating” justification and held that economic benefit alone
was not sufficient under the state constitution to justify a taking of private
property.  In 2006, similar invalidations based on state constitutions38
occurred in Michigan,  Oklahoma,  and Pennsylvania.39 40 41
6
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42. This is not to suggest that all property law develops out of rash public opinion or even
out of the persuasion of dominant interest groups. According to Saul Levmore, property law
develops in two different ways: (1) on an efficient path where new property rights evolve out of the
expectation that the value from their creation will exceed the expected costs and (2) out of the ideas
of interest groups using their political influence to obtain property laws they deem favorable. Saul
Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 182–83 (2003);
see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72,
100 (2005) (arguing that interest groups often seek to change the law in certain states rather than
pursue “sweeping national changes”).
43. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of Fla., Crist Offers Ideas for Protecting
Property Rights (Aug. 17, 2005), available at http://myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/
2D9FC76C62CA763085257060005AC48C.
44. 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004). 
45. Id. at 532 (“We acknowledge that the courts of Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, New
Hampshire, South Carolina and Washington have, using a narrow view of their public-use clauses,
ruled that economic development is, by itself, not public use for eminent domain purposes.”
(footnote omitted)). 
46. See Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1975); see also
Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608, 613–14 (Fla. 1957) (approving small, private concession
buildings on condemned land because they were incidental to the other public facilities); Sunny
Isles Fishing Pier v. Dade County, 79 So. 2d 667, 667–69 (Fla. 1955) (approving a lease for a
private fishing pier on a large public beach); Gate City Garage, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So.
2d 653, 658–59 (Fla. 1953) (approving a lease on property seized by eminent domain where the
remainder of the property was used as a large public parking lot). Although the court in Baycol used
the term “public purpose” synonymously with “public use,” Baycol, 315 So. 2d at 455, the Florida
Supreme Court later viewed this language as dictum and indicated a stricter eminent domain
standard requiring “public use.” See Dep’t of Transp. v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 532 So.
2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. 1988); see also Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 783 So. 2d 238, 251 n.16
(Fla. 2001). Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court has distinguished between “public benefit”
and “public purpose,” permitting only the latter to serve as a justification for using eminent domain.
See Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1959); cf. White v. Pinellas
County, 185 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. 1966) (“‘[P]ublic purpose’ or ‘public use’ . . . in this case, as in
many others, . . . are synonymous.”).
47. 315 So. 2d 451 (1975).
If the Florida Legislature had sufficiently considered state case law, the
legislature might have realized that its fears of eminent domain being used
for economic redevelopment lacked a solid foundation.  After all,42
Florida’s constitutional and statutory law provided greater private-property
protection than either the U.S. Constitution or the Connecticut law
analyzed in Kelo.  In fact, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated, in its43
Kelo decision,  that Florida had a more restrictive view of what44
constituted a “public use.”  45
Florida’s previous takings system permitted some private benefit but
only when the benefit was merely incidental to a public purpose.  Most46
notably, in Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Development Authority,  the Florida47
Supreme Court reaffirmed that the government could not use eminent
7
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48. Id. at 455.
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 453–54.
51. Id. at 458.
52. 115 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
53. Id. at 750 (holding valid provisions that allow the clearance and private redevelopment
of “slum areas” where the redevelopment relates directly to the public health, safety, and welfare);
see also Baycol, 315 So. 2d at 457 (noting that Grubstein validated “condemnation of blighted or
slum areas for public housing as a public purpose . . . based upon proof that the area involved had
become infested with crime and disease affecting the public health and welfare, which, of course,
is a proper public purpose”).
54. See Johnson, supra note 17 (quoting Michael Allan Wolf, a professor at the University
of Florida Levin College of Law).
55. For example, “corruption” might result if an interest group “captured” the condemnation
process to profit personally. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 546; Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and
the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
49, 52 (1998); see also STEVEN GREENHUT, ABUSE OF POWER: HOW THE GOVERNMENT MISUSES
EMINENT DOMAIN 1–2 (2004) (typifying eminent domain corruption as where the government tells
a landowner that she must surrender her property to make way for development by “a wealthy
developer—perhaps a big campaign contributor and mover and shaker in the community, or an out-
of-town corporation promising an expanded tax base”).
56. See, e.g., DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-
STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 52 (2003), available at
http://www.castlecoalition.org/ pdf/report/ED_report.pdf. Berliner’s report lists a total number of
“known condemnations benefiting private parties,” but the report gleans this number primarily from
news stories. Id. In Florida, based on this arguably inaccurate information regarding a five-year
period, there were only eight known development projects, resulting in sixty-seven filed
condemnations, that would benefit a private party. Id. During that same period, there were 14,319
condemnations filed for all purposes in Florida. Id. Despite the report’s finding that only 0.47% of
filed condemnations had a “private benefit,” the report concludes that “Florida cities are eager to
use eminent domain as a redevelopment . . . tool.” Id. Moreover, Berliner’s report fails to explain
whether the private benefit was incidental to some much greater public benefit or whether there was
domain to take private property for a predominantly private use.  Rather,48
the government could exercise eminent domain only for necessary public
uses.  In Baycol, the government condemned property on which a parking49
garage and a shopping mall would be constructed.  Although the proposed50
parking was for the public, the court refused to validate the taking because
there was no “public need” for parking absent the private shopping mall.51
Similarly, in Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency,  the Florida Supreme52
Court indicated that mere economic redevelopment could not justify the
use of eminent domain.  Thus, in Florida, there was not a legitimate fear53
that “‘big, bad government’” would take our land.  54
B.  Rampant Corruption Was Illusory
The fear of corruption in the takings process also drove the pervasive
eminent domain reforms.  Eminent domain abuse has certainly been55
documented,  but such abuse was not actually as prevalent as thought.56
8
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actually corruption that benefitted one at the expense of many. See also GREENHUT, supra note 55,
at 2 (construing Berliner’s data to support the proposition that “[i]n thousands of documented recent
cases . . . property owners are being forced to sacrifice their dreams to government agents acting
on behalf of big developers, gambling casinos, large retail stores and multibillion-dollar
corporations”).
57. See 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 49 (2007).
58. See BERLINER, supra note 56, at 5.
59. Id.
60. See 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 49 (2007).
61. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 544 (arguing that “there is always a risk that the claimed
public benefit . . . is ‘merely incidental’ to the true benefits accruing to the benefited private
transferee” because of the deferential review of the public-use requirement).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 46–53.
63. See Timothy Sandefur, Mine and Thine Distinct: What Kelo Says About Our Path, 10
CHAP. L. REV. 1, 35 (2006) (describing several eminent domain abuses, including New Jersey’s
condemnation of property in Atlantic City that allowed Donald Trump to build a limousine parking
lot).
64. Using this logic, one could ask whether we should prohibit corporations from giving
stock options to CEOs because of egregious and highly publicized examples of stock option fraud
by executives. See Charles Forelle & Nick Wingfield, Apple Cites New ‘Irregularities,’ May
Restate Results, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2006, at A3 (noting that more than eighty firms were under
investigation for improprieties relating to backdating of stock options).
65. See supra note 46; see also Carrie Weimar, Crimping Eminent Domain, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at 1B (noting that a city-owned parking garage, used by privately owned
businesses, was built on land obtained through eminent domain).
66. See infra Part IV.
Although eliminating “slum” and “blight” has long been considered a
“public use,”  some people may have viewed the government’s use of57
eminent domain for this purpose as improper because of their
misunderstanding of what conditions were necessary for an area to be
deemed “blighted.”  Indeed, “the ordinary person pictures blight as rats58
and buildings that are falling down,”  even though such extreme59
circumstances have never been required for a property to be considered in
this category.  Further, the public may have had a general impression that60
a purported “public use” after the taking was merely incidental to some
underlying private benefit.  Florida law, however, previously addressed61
this issue by requiring any private benefit to be incidental to a justified
public purpose.62
To be sure, egregious examples fueled public perception,  but those63
extreme examples should not have been enough to prohibit the use of
eminent domain for mostly beneficial projects.  Unfortunately, the more64
difficult case, where a project has a minor private benefit but a great public
purpose,  does not make for an exciting news story. Thus, the public never65
learns about those types of projects. Still, if the Florida Legislature wanted
to curb the perceived abuse, it failed to recognize other legal avenues that
government officials with corrupt purposes might use to achieve the same
ends.66
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67. See supra note 17.
68. “‘Any fool can criticize, condemn and complain and most fools do.’” Thinkexist.com,
Criticism Quotes, http://thinkexist.com/quotations/criticism/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (quoting
Benjamin Franklin).
69. Patricia Salkin, an associate dean and director of the Government Law Center at Albany
Law School, warned that “quick reactions [to Kelo] can lead to ineffective policy.” Jarosz, supra
note 34, at 39. She recognized that most legislators want to be able to extoll their accomplishments
to voters; thus, legislators will act before carefully examining their states’ practices. Id.
70. See Jeb Bush, Florida Safeguards Private Property, TAMPA TRIB., May 15, 2006, at 15;
Press Release, Castle Coal., Florida Enacts Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform, Bill One of
Strongest Passed Nationwide (May 12, 2006), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/media/
releases/5_12_06pr.html; Press Release, FreedomWorks, FreedomWorks Florida Applauds Florida
Eminent Domain Reform (May 18, 2006), available at http://www.freedomworks.org/newsroom/
press_template.php?press_id=1813; Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of Fla., supra note
43.
71. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
72. Charlie Crist was elected Florida’s governor in November 2006. Florida Governor
Charlie Christ: Executive Office of the Governor, Biography, http://www.flgov.com/gov_biography
(last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
73. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of Fla., supra note 43.
74. See H.B. 1567(NS), 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (first engrossed version, Apr. 5,
III.  THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT FULLY CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES
OF REFORM
Florida was not alone in reacting quickly to Kelo.  This Note’s67
discussion in Part II is not intended merely to criticize  but rather to68
explain that Florida’s legislative process was not deliberately conceived.
By reacting quickly, the Florida Legislature inadequately addressed the
complicated issue of eminent domain  and created an overly broad and69
ambiguous legislative framework.
A.  Prohibiting Eminent Domain to Abate Public Nuisances
Private-property rights activists and Florida officials applauded the
creation of the House Select Committee to Protect Private Property
Rights.  However, almost no one predicted that the legislation that70
ultimately passed  would be so extreme. For example, then-Florida71
Attorney General Charlie Crist’s  recommendations to the committee72
included (1) strengthening the criteria for determining whether “blight”
exists and (2) shifting the presumption to favor the property owner instead
of the government.73
Mostly consistent with these recommendations, the committee’s
proposed legislation eliminated “slum” and “blight” as justifications for
using eminent domain but permitted using eminent domain to eliminate
threats to public health and safety.  The committee unanimously approved74
10
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2006); Stephen Majors, House Panel Seeks Checks on Eminent Domain, BRADENTON HERALD,
Mar. 14, 2006, at 1.
75. Majors, supra note 74. The committee eventually reached a consensus that an “existing
threat to health or safety” could justify a local government’s use of eminent domain. Stephen Majors,
Lawmakers Working to Protect Private Property, BRADENTON HERALD, Feb. 22, 2006, at 7.
76. Majors, supra note 74 (noting that the Florida Legislature could instruct the courts that
a fire hazard or vermin infestation constituted a threat to public health and safety).
77. S. JOUR. 108-18, Reg. Sess., at 798–99 (Fla. 2006). 
78. Id.
79. S. JOUR. 108-20, Reg. Sess., at 799, 804 (Fla. 2006). 
80. H.R. JOUR. 108-26, Reg. Sess., at 984 (Fla. 2006).
81. The current statute reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter provision,
ordinance, statute, or special law, the state, any political subdivision as defined in
s. 1.01(8), or any other entity to which the power of eminent domain is delegated
may not exercise the power of eminent domain to take private property for the
purpose of abating or eliminating a public nuisance. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, including any charter provision, ordinance, statute, or special
law, abating or eliminating a public nuisance is not a valid public purpose or use
for which private property may be taken by eminent domain and does not satisfy
the public purpose requirement of s. 6(a), Art. X of the State Constitution. This
subsection does not diminish the power of counties or municipalities to adopt or
enforce county or municipal ordinances related to code enforcement or the
elimination of public nuisances to the extent such ordinances do not authorize the
taking of private property by eminent domain.
FLA. STAT. § 73.014(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
82. See infra notes 193–94 and accompanying text; see also Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc.
v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. 1972) (“The Legislature has broad discretion to
designate a particular activity to be a public nuisance.” (citing Pompano Horse Club v. State ex rel.
this proposed legislation.  Specifically, the committee intended that the75
legislature provide courts with guidelines for determining when threats to
health and safety existed.  On May 2, 2006, however, on motions by76
Florida Senator Daniel Webster, the bill was withdrawn from the
Committees on Judiciary and Community Affairs, and a significant
amendment was proposed.  The amendment would create Florida Statutes77
§ 73.014, which would prohibit the use of eminent domain to abate or
eliminate public nuisances, including ongoing public health and safety
threats.  78
Two days later, the Senate adopted Webster’s amendment, passed the
bill, and certified it to the Florida House of Representatives,  which79
unanimously concurred.  Within those two days, local governments were80
stripped of the power to use eminent domain to deal with public
nuisances.  This prohibition likely resulted from a concern about abuse of81
the “public nuisance” classification. Indeed, courts had given discretion to
local governments’ classifications of activities as public nuisances.82
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Bryan, 111 So. 801 (Fla. 1927))); Bal Harbour Vill. v. Welsh, 879 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA
2004) (“The legislature has broad discretion to declare a particular activity to be a public nuisance
and enact legislation to abate [it].”).
83. See Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 876–77 (Fla. 2001); City of Saint
Petersburg v. Bowen, 675 So. 2d 626, 631–32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
84. 801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001). 
85. Id. at 876–77.
86. Id. at 877. However, where another property’s operation was inextricably intertwined
with drug-related activity, the court allowed a similar temporary closure. Id. at 876; see also infra
notes 178–84 and accompanying text.
87. 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
88. Id. at 628, 632.
89. Id. at 627–28, 632.
90. Id. at 629.
91. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 565–66, 565 n.438 (noting that these “benign” uses, where
a government’s assessment of whether to condemn property is more likely to be made in good faith,
would be prohibited by an overarching rule without exceptions).
92. See Alan C. Weinstein, Commentary, Eminent Domain: Judicial and Legislative
Responses to Kelo, PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Nov. 2006, at 3, 10.
But this prohibition is overly broad, especially because Florida case
law already held that overly restrictive nuisance abatement actions
constituted takings.  In Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami,  the Florida83 84
Supreme Court invalidated a one-year closure of an apartment complex by
the city’s nuisance abatement board.  The court reasoned that there was85
no indication of persistent drug activity at the complex.  Similarly, the86
Second District Court of Appeal in City of Saint Petersburg v. Bowen87
concluded that a temporary compensable taking occurred when the city
ordered Bowen’s property closed for one year.  The appellate court88
reasoned that although the city had determined that illegal drug activity on
Bowen’s property created a public nuisance, the closure constituted a
taking because it proscribed all uses of the property rather than the
particular nuisance.  The appellate court also noted that the closure was89
“one of the most invasive methods of abating the purported nuisance that
was available.”  90
B.  Prohibiting “Beneficial Takings”
Although the legislature explicitly prohibited the use of eminent
domain to abate public nuisances, it did away with an entire category of
takings more subtly. The near-total prohibition on taking private property
and then transferring the property to private ownership precludes
“beneficial takings” from occurring.  There are many privately run91
operations that, although not traditional “public uses” (e.g., roads and
public utility facilities),  fulfill a considerable “public purpose.” Florida’s92
current rule prevents the government from using eminent domain for
12
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93. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 565. Also, parking garages and other redevelopment projects
that have proven successful have been prohibited under the new framework. See Johnson, supra
note 17; Weimar, supra note 65.
94. FLA. STAT. § 166.411 (2007) (authorizing the use of eminent domain to accomplish the
purposes stated in § 180.06).
95. See id. § 73.013 (expressly prohibiting the transfer of property taken by eminent domain
to a private entity).
96. See Posting of Richard Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2005/06/the_kelo_case_p.html (June 26, 2005, 21:09 EST) (noting that the City
of New London’s use of eminent domain likely would survive a public-use challenge if it had built
office space and parking on condemned land).
97. See Weimar, supra note 65.
98. George W. Bush, then-managing partner of the Texas Rangers Major League Baseball
team, helped convince the city of Arlington, Texas, to use eminent domain to seize property for a
privately run baseball complex. See City of Arlington v. Golddust Twins Realty Corp., 41 F.3d 960,
962 (5th Cir. 1994); Bob Sablatura, Campaign ’94: George W. Bush; Campaign Brings Renewed
Scrutiny of Stadium Deal, HOUSTON CHRON., May 8, 1994, at A11.
99. See Moffat, supra note 14, at 1120–21 (“The immediate outcry of protest [from Kelo] has
resulted in many large, socially worthwhile projects being dropped for fear of adverse publicity.”).
100. See supra note 22.
101. See infra Part IV.C.
102. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
“beneficial takings,” such as constructing performing arts centers, sports
arenas, not-for-profit hospitals, or museums operated by non-public
entities.93
Interestingly, the Florida Statutes expressly authorize the use of
eminent domain to construct, among other things, hospitals.  However,94
this authorization is tempered by the fact that property for this use cannot
be transferred to a private entity.  Expectedly, prohibiting the transfer of95
lands taken by eminent domain to a private entity will lead to government-
run development and enterprises,  such as hospitals, parking facilities,96 97
and stadiums,  or will prevent advantageous projects from being98
constructed.  The Florida Constitution does provide a window of99
opportunity for privately run beneficial takings—the legislature may
permit this type of taking with the support of three-fifths of both houses.100
But one has to wonder whether this exception will lead to the undesirable
outcome of merely shifting the risk of corruption from local governments
to the state legislature.  101
C.  Creating Ambiguity in the Law
The legislative vote that is required to convey “[p]rivate property taken
by eminent domain . . . to a natural person or private entity”  is also102
ambiguous. This ambiguity becomes evident by considering two common
scenarios. First, an electric company wishes to acquire, via the local
government’s exercise of eminent domain, a utility easement through a
13
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103. “[O]wnership or control of property acquired [by eminent domain] may not be
conveyed . . . to a natural person or private entity . . . except . . . to a natural person or private
entity: . . . (c) That is a public or private utility for use in providing electricity services or
systems, . . . telephone . . . , or similar services or systems . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 73.013(1) (2007).
104. See supra note 22. 
105. House Bill 1567, which created Florida Statutes § 73.013, became effective on May 11,
2006. See supra note 21. The constitutional amendment became law upon passage on November
7, 2006. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 21, 103.
107. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
108. See State ex rel. Curley v. McGeachy, 6 So. 2d 823, 827 (Fla. 1942) (“The provisions of
the Constitution will always prevail over statutes where there is conflict between the two . . . .”);
Pub. Med. Assistance Trust Fund v. Hameroff, 689 So. 2d 358, 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
(“[N]either the common law nor a state statute can supercede a provision of the federal or state
constitutions.”).
109. See supra note 22.
110. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6 (emphasis added). 
neighborhood. Second, the electric company wishes to convey a portion
of that easement to a broadband Internet company. Both conveyances are
seemingly permitted under Florida Statutes § 73.013, which provides
exceptions to the prohibition on private-to-private transfers of land taken
by eminent domain.  However, the Florida Constitution now prohibits the103
conveyance of private property taken by eminent domain “to a natural
person or private entity.”  104
An ambiguity arises from the sequence in which these provisions were
enacted.  Although a conveyance to a utility is permitted by the statute,105 106
the subsequently passed  constitutional amendment would supersede the107
statute.  Thus, according to the express terms of the Florida Constitution,108
the Florida Legislature must approve by a three-fifths majority a general
law authorizing these simple transfers.  109
It is also unclear whether the legislature would be permitted to pass a
“blanket” authorization for such transfers or whether the legislature would
be constitutionally required to authorize the transfers on an ad hoc basis.
Indeed, the express language of the Florida Constitution is singular:
“[P]roperty taken . . . pursuant to a petition to initiate condemnation
proceedings . . . .”  Therefore, a legislative authorization for multiple110
transfers might be unconstitutional.
Moreover, even if an electric company could lawfully acquire the
easement by eminent domain (i.e., it was not deemed a transfer but an
initial acquisition) under Florida Statutes § 73.013, as in the first example,
the subsequent transfer to a broadband Internet company would be
prohibited by the Florida Constitution. The electric company is a private
entity that acquired private property by eminent domain, and now the
electric company wishes to convey that property to the broadband Internet
14
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111. Merely because Florida law permits the electric company to acquire property taken by
eminent domain does not render the company a public entity.
112. See Weimar, supra note 65. This is because acquiring property through eminent domain
involves the costs of litigating the taking in court. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at
1441; see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 69
(1995) (noting that an empirical study of the use of eminent domain verified that eminent domain
is less efficient than voluntary transfers for acquiring property (citing Patricia Munch, An Economic
Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473, 473–97 (1976))); infra note 210 and
accompanying text (describing the statutory procedures for taking property under eminent domain).
113. FLA. STAT. § 166.401 (2007) (requiring the local government to adopt a resolution
authorizing the acquisition of property by eminent domain); id. §§ 74.031–.111 (requiring the
condemning authority to file a declaration of taking, including a statement about the property taken
and an appraisal of each parcel in the proceeding; the clerk of the court to issue summons to show
cause to the affected landowners; and hearings if the landowners request them); FISCHEL, supra
note 112, at 69.
114. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 1416, 1439–40 (arguing that a strict public-
use requirement will likely encourage more uncompensated government takings that are achieved
by using other available government powers). To combat this phenomenon, Bell and Parchomovsky
suggest that the public-use rule “should be set to match the rules restricting other government
powers.” Id. at 1439. A system without such a comprehensive framework would lead to other
undesirable results because “‘[i]n a state where corruption abounds, laws must be very numerous.’”
Thinkexist.com, Corruption Quotes, http://thinkexist.com/quotes/with/keyword/corruption/2.html
(quoting Publius Cornelius Tacitus) (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
company, another private entity.  Although the legislature likely did not111
intend to prohibit this type of transfer, the Florida Constitution’s express
language would forbid the transfer.
IV.  UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM
Even more than the specific consequences that result from the
legislative language, the entire scheme of eminent domain reform will
result in a general host of negative consequences. Governments typically
used eminent domain as a last resort to acquire land for economic
redevelopment because settling the dispute directly with the landowner
was more practical, easier, and less expensive.  Governments preferred112
settling because seeking to take property by eminent domain required
governments to follow elaborate statutory procedures.  Despite the recent113
reforms, those officials who would use government power for corrupt
purposes will continue to do so. However, without the ability to use
eminent domain for projects that will end up in private hands, these
officials will turn to mechanisms that lack the same procedural checks and
are more harmful to property owners.  114
Indeed, Florida’s current system does not prohibit the government from
seizing property; instead, the system merely prohibits seizure through the
15
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115. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 1426–27.
116. Id. at 1416, 1427–33. Yet despite the concern that “[w]e now have government taxes on
our property to the point we feel like renters of the property from the government instead of
owners,” H.R. JOUR. 108-11, Reg. Sess., at 363 (Fla. 2006) (explanation of vote by Rep. Bob
Allen), the Florida Legislature did not attempt to couple the recent eminent domain reform with
additional measures to scrutinize taxation.
117. See FLA. STAT. § 73.014(1) (2007) (“This subsection does not diminish the power of
counties or municipalities to adopt or enforce county or municipal ordinances related to code
enforcement or the elimination of public nuisances to the extent such ordinances do not authorize
the taking of private property by eminent domain.”).
118. The government can have the same effect on property by using its taxing power or
regulatory powers as it can by using eminent domain. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at
1432. Bell and Parchomovsky point out the uses of these three powers to achieve the same result:
In the first instance, the government uses its power of eminent domain to seize a
use right over a small strip of a lot that abuts a stream and imposes a conservation
easement. In the second instance, using its regulatory powers, the government
forbids all nonconservational use of the small strip abutting the stream. In the third
case, the government taxes lots abutting the stream at the value of the uses carried
out within the small abutting strip.
Id.
119. See supra note 22.
120. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 1416.
121. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 703 (1880).
122. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1916) (noting that a tax would
violate the Fifth Amendment only if the tax is “so arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that
it was not the exertion of taxation, but a confiscation of property”); Quarty v. United States, 170
F.3d 961, 968–69 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that only arbitrarily imposed taxes violate the Takings
Clause).
123. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 1433; Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics
of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 66 (1986). This is true despite the recognition that “the
power to tax involves the power to destroy.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
use of eminent domain.  A local government can still tax, regulate,  and115 116
attempt to abate public nuisances  to effectively seize property or to117
coerce landowners into selling their property.  Additionally, the Florida118
Legislature can override the prohibition on private-to-private transfers,119
and this power merely shifts the risk of “corruption” from local
governments to the state. Unfortunately, the public did not properly see
eminent domain “as the least offensive of government’s property-related
powers.”120
A.  Unbridled Use of the Powers to Tax and Regulate
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “taxation for a public purpose,
however great, [is not a] taking.”  Unless a tax is completely arbitrary,121 122
the government may legitimately exercise its taxing power to “take” a
landowner’s property without consent and without compensation.123
16
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124. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 1432. Although Florida’s “Save Our Homes”
Act prevents local governments from increasing a homesteaded property’s assessed value by more
than 3% annually, the Act does not limit the taxes that the government can impose. See FLA. STAT.
§ 193.155 (2007); City of Jacksonville, Fla., Property Appraiser, Save Our Homes—Amendment
10—Homestead Cap, http://www.coj.net/Departments/ Property+Appraiser/Save+Our+Homes-
Amendment+10.htm#Taxcap (last visited Feb. 10, 2008); Palm Beach County, Property Appraiser,
Save Our Homes, http://www.co.palm-beach.fl.us/papa/SaveOurHomes.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2008); Leon County, Property Appraiser, FAQ Answers—Save Our Homes,
http://www.co.leon.fl.us/propappr/faq2.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
125. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 1432. Courts have upheld even “in-kind
taxation,” which requires the taxpayer to pay in property other than cash, allowing the government
to directly seize the taxed property’s title. Id.; see also Eduardo Moises Penalver, Regulatory
Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2208–10 (2004) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has
upheld a state’s authority to tax property in-kind).
126. See FLA. STAT. ch. 170 (2007); id. §§ 197.363, .3632.
127. Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So. 2d 180, 184 (Fla. 1995);
Penalver, supra note 125, at 2201–04; see also Harris v. Wilson, 693 So. 2d 945, 949 (Fla. 1997)
(upholding a special assessment because there was competent, substantial evidence to support the
government’s conclusions of a special benefit from the assessment and those conclusions were not
arbitrary); State v. Sarasota County, 693 So. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. 1997); Eric Kades, Drawing the Line
Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Burdens Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 189, 258 (2002) (“[E]ven a slight, tenuous correlation between the amount paid in
taxes or assessments . . . and the benefits received . . . is sufficient to shield a measure from a
takings challenge.”). To be valid, “special assessments” must be likely to confer some specific
benefits on the affected property owners. 2 RALPH E. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS § 34.01[8] (rev. vol. 2006).
128. Lake County v. Water Oak Mgmt. Corp., 695 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla. 1997).
129. Id.
130. Bodner v. City of Coral Gables, 245 So. 2d 250, 253 (Fla. 1971).
131. Sarasota County, 693 So. 2d at 548–49; Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So. 2d at
186–87.
132. Water Oak Mgmt. Corp., 695 So. 2d at 670; Harris, 693 So. 2d at 947.
133. Quietwater Entm’t, Inc. v. Escambia County, 890 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005);
Williams v. Escambia County, 725 So. 2d 392, 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
134. Water Oak Mgmt. Corp., 695 So. 2d at 670.
Because local governments generally assess real-estate taxes, these
governments can extraordinarily affect property values  and can even124
seize title to private property.125
Moreover, a local government may impose very different taxes or
narrowly targeted “special assessments”  on select groups of property126
owners, as long as the basis is not completely arbitrary.  In fact, to be127
valid, the services funded by a special assessment do not need to confer a
unique benefit on the affected property.  There needs to be only a logical128
relationship between the services provided and the benefit conferred.  In129
Florida, courts have upheld special assessments for funding road
projects,  water management programs,  solid-waste disposal130 131
services,  police protection,  and fire protection.  132 133 134
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135. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 1432–33. The U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently rejected challenges to taxes asserted to be excessive. Penalver, supra note 125, at 2199.
In fact, the Supreme Court upheld a tax that threatened to put a taxpayer out of business. Id.
(discussing how the Supreme Court in City of Pittsburg v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369
(1974), upheld a 20% tax on parking receipts even though the tax threatened to render the
taxpayer’s business unprofitable).
136. See Shannon Behnken, Priced Out of Paradise, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 22, 2007, at 1
(discussing the negative effects of high property taxes on property ownership); see also Steve
Bousquet, Legislators’ Big Challenge: Taxes, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at 1A; David
McKalip, Florida Needs Tax Cap, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at 17A.
137. See FLA. STAT. § 170.10 (2007) (providing the procedure for instituting legal proceedings
against a property owner who fails timely to pay special assessments and for foreclosing on
property for nonpayment); id. § 173.01 (allowing municipalities to foreclose on special assessment
liens). When the local government approves the special assessment by resolution, the assessment
lien attaches to the property. BOYER, supra note 127, at § 34.01[8].
138. See infra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
140. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 1432–33.
141. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
142. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
143. Id. at 124, 126.
144. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
145. Id. at 1028–29. The Court indicated that situations where the government deprives a
landowner of all economically beneficial use are “relatively rare.” Id. at 1019.
146. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
No judicial doctrine exists that mandates when a landowner should be
compensated because of excessive taxation.  Thus, a local government135
could impose high taxes or special assessments to persuade people to
sell.  If they do not sell and taxes go unpaid, then the government may136
seize the property  and ultimately turn the property over to a private137
entity.138
Unlike the broad judicial deference given to taxes,  “courts have139
developed a massive regulatory takings jurisprudence” to analyze property
regulations.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that regulations resulting140
in a permanent physical invasion of property constitute takings.141
Additionally, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,  the142
Court listed factors for courts to consider when determining whether a
regulation rises to the level of a taking: the extent of interference with the
owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, the character of the
governmental action, and the degree of diminution in property value.143
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,  the Court found that a144
regulation not targeted at nuisance prevention amounts to a taking if the
regulation deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial use of the
property.  Overarching these tests, substantive due process requires that145
regulations substantially advance a legitimate state interest  and yield a146
government benefit that is roughly proportional to the property
18
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147. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
148. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 1431. To steer clear of a regulatory-takings
challenge, a government could also use its taxing power to achieve the same result. See Note, The
Principle of Equality in Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1038 (1996)
(arguing that South Carolina could have avoided the Takings Clause scrutiny and effectively
prohibited Lucas from developing his beachfront property by taxing him “at an amount that made
it fiscally impossible for him to build a home there).
149. 762 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).




154. Id. at 981–82. Sosa presented his Harris Act claim, see infra notes 165–70 and
accompanying text, to the city less than 180 days before filing suit and failed to present the city
with a property appraisal supporting his claim before bringing suit. Id. at 982. 
The Act . . . requires that “[n]ot less than 180 days prior to filing an action under
this section against a government entity, a property owner . . . must present the
claim in writing to the head of the governmental entity. The property owner must
submit, along with the claim, a bona fide, valid appraisal that supports the claim
and demonstrates the loss in fair market value to the real property . . . .”
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a) (1997) (final three alterations in original)).
155. Using this power, the government may adversely affect land values just as much as a
partial taking would. See FISCHEL, supra note 112, at 1.
156. See Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (holding that
the county’s limitation on development for “resource protection” did not on its face constitute a
surrendered.  As long as a government avoids or passes these regulatory147
takings tests, it may enact regulations that effectively seize property
without providing compensation.  148
A local government may enact regulations to force landowners to jump
through strict “procedural hoops” to maintain their property. For example,
in Sosa v. City of West Palm Beach,  the landowner’s lack of diligence149
led to a government-imposed demolition of his property.  In Sosa, the150
city issued a notice and order of condemnation on a structure that Sosa was
remodeling.  The city claimed that an inspection revealed that the151
structure was severely deteriorated, violated multiple codes, would cost
more to repair than the estimated value, and was unsafe for human
habitation.  After the owner repeatedly failed to obtain the proper152
certifications and permits yet continued work on his property, the city
ordered demolition of the structure.  Sosa brought a claim to challenge153
the demolition, but the court dismissed it on procedural grounds because
Sosa had not complied with the prerequisites for bringing suit.  154
A local government may also use its zoning power to negatively affect
land values  and ultimately obtain property. For example, the government155
could limit development,  institute temporary moratoriums on processing156
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taking).
157. See WCI Cmtys., Inc. v. City of Coral Springs, 885 So. 2d 912, 914–16 (Fla. 4th DCA
2004) (holding that the city’s use of a temporary moratorium in processing development
applications, which caused WCI’s inability to meet its financial commitments, did not constitute
a taking). The Florida Legislature proposed an amendment that would make moratoriums on
development that last longer than one year actionable under the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property
Rights Protection Act, but the proposal died in committee. See S. 2852(NS), 109th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2007); see also infra notes 165–70 and accompanying text.
158. See Bradfordville Phipps Ltd. P’ship v. Leon County, 804 So. 2d 464, 468, 471 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2001) (holding that the county’s twenty-two-month injunction on issuing development
permits in a particular area was not a regulatory taking). But see supra note 157 (discussing the
Florida Legislature’s attempt to discourage moratoriums lasting longer than one year). 
159. However, the government may not use such designations solely to depress land values.
See Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1990) (“[D]eliberately
attempting to depress land values in anticipation of eminent domain proceedings . . . has been
consistently prohibited.”).
160. 641 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1994).
161. Id. at 51, 54.
162. Id. at 53–54. Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court has found that a map of reservation
by the Florida Department of Transportation does not constitute a regulatory taking unless the
landowner can show that the map deprived him of all or substantial economic use of his property.
Weisenfeld v. Dep’t of Transp., 640 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1994), aff’g 617 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 5th DCA
1993).
163. The court in Wright noted that the map may result in a taking, but actions for inverse
condemnation must be brought by individual landowners who would have to demonstrate the
various factors that lead to a regulatory taking. Wright, 641 So. 2d at 54.
164. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54, 57
(Fla. 1994) (finding that although the roadway reservations were found invalid in a previous case,
landowners with property inside the boundaries of the map were not entitled to a per se finding of
a taking).
site plan applications,  or impose injunctions on issuing development157
permits  in particular areas. Additionally, the government could use its158
comprehensive plan to designate certain areas for future government
use.  159
In Palm Beach County v. Wright,  the Florida Supreme Court found160
that a municipality may legitimately adopt a thoroughfare map to
designate corridors for future roadways and to forbid land use activity that
would impede future construction of the roadway.  Although the map161
was not recorded, was frequently amended, and could adversely affect
property values, the court upheld the validity of the map because of the
legitimate governmental interest in effective planning.  The court noted162
that even if an individual landowner successfully challenged such a map
on the ground that it deprived the landowner of substantially all of the
property without compensation,  the government could “choose between163
paying just compensation to keep the regulation in effect or removing the
regulation.”164
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165. FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (2007) (creating a cause of action for property owners aggrieved by
government action that “inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested right to
a specific use of real property”).
166. See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Florida’s Private Property Rights Protection Act:
Does It Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 695, 702–03 (1996). The
landowner must show that (1) the regulation leaves him “permanently unable to realize investment-
backed expectations on the property” or (2) the regulation disproportionately burdens the landowner
and leaves the property with permanently unreasonable uses. Roy Hunt, Property Rights and
Wrongs: Historic Preservation and Florida’s 1995 Private Property Rights Protection Act, 48 FLA.
L. REV. 709, 717 (1996).
167. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e) (2007).
168. See Juergensmeyer, supra note 166, at 703.
The great irony of the Harris Act is that it sought to bring clarity to the admittedly
muddled body of case law regarding regulatory takings and be more protective of
property rights by creating a remedy for “inordinate burdens,” an impact of
regulation that explicitly falls short of the federal taking standard. Yet it uses, and
in some case modifies, the same terms of art as federal taking case law to flesh out
the meaning of “inordinate burden,” while saying that the terms cannot be
construed with reference to that case law.
Susan L. Trevarthen, Advising the Client Regarding Protection of Property Rights: Harris Act and
Inverse Condemnation Claims, FLA. B.J., July–Aug. 2004, at 61, 63.
169. See Trevarthen, supra note 168, at 64. Still, the Act provides landowners with some
leverage in obtaining government settlements from burdensome regulation. See id. at 64–65; see
also Charlotte County Park of Commerce, L.L.C. v. Charlotte County, 927 So. 2d 236, 239 (Fla.
2d DCA 2006) (discussing a settlement agreement arising from a landowner’s possible Harris Act
claim). 
170. See, e.g., Osceola County v. Best Diversified, Inc., 936 So. 2d 55, 59 (Fla. 5th DCA
2006) (disallowing a landowner’s recovery under the Harris Act for the county’s denial of a
conditional use permit to operate a landfill); Palm Beach Polo, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 918 So.
2d 988, 994–95 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (denying a developer’s suit under the Harris Act because the
land was subject to a development limitation at the time of its purchase; thus, the developer had no
reasonable investment-backed expectation of development); Sosa v. City of West Palm Beach, 762
So. 2d 981, 981–82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (dismissing a Harris Act suit because the landowner failed
to present an appraisal prior to filing suit and filed the suit before the 180-day waiting period had
lapsed). 
More than a decade ago, the Florida Legislature attempted to protect
landowners from overly burdensome regulation by enacting the Bert J.
Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act.  Under the Act, a165
court faced with a challenged regulation must determine whether the
regulation puts an “inordinate burden” on the property owner.  Although166
the statute attempts to define “inordinate burden,”  the definition is vague167
and expansive.  The uncertainty in this definition and others in the Act168
may have been the reason that so few suits were filed under the Act.169
Moreover, those suits that have been filed have generally been
unsuccessful.170
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171. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 1435. Of course, the government’s actions
should not be considered for purposes of determining the market value of the land being taken. See
Dade County v. Still, 377 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1979).
172. Threatening to take property is not as feasible under the new framework, but the
government could still negatively affect land values by falsely insinuating that the property would
be taken for a prescribed “public purpose.” This insinuation would achieve the same result because
speculation would lower the perceived economic viability of the property.
173. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
175. See Best Diversified, 936 So. 2d at 57–58. In Best Diversified, the owner of a forty-acre
property, which had been used as a landfill since the 1960s, operated a construction and demolition
debris facility under a five-year permit from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection
(FDEP) and a conditional use permit from the Board of County Commissioners. Id. at 57. The
landowner’s re-application for the FDEP and county permits was denied based on neighbors’
complaints of noxious odors. Id. at 57–58. Although the landowner contended that the FDEP and
the county prevented him from properly closing the landfill to allow it to be put to non-landfill uses,
the court found that he was not entitled to compensation because no taking had occurred. Id. at
59–60.
176. See Windward Marina, L.L.C. v. City of Destin, 743 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). In
Windward Marina, the court upheld the City of Destin’s denial of the plaintiff’s application for a
final development order to construct a dry-dock marina. Id. at 640. In doing so, the court reasoned
Thus, using its police power to tax and regulate, the government may
harass landowners and negatively affect property values to coerce
landowners to sell at or below fair market value. Moreover, a landowner
who has to bear the cost of litigation to challenge a government action
would likely sell when faced with depressed land values and the
knowledge that the government would likely win on the grounds of having
a legitimate state interest. This coercive method is akin to “condemnation
blight.” Condemnation blight involves the use of the government’s
regulatory powers or other policies to lower the compensation it must pay
for a future taking.  Although no future taking can occur under Florida’s171
current framework,  a government could use the similarly corrupt172
practices of excessive taxation or regulation to compel a landowner to sell
to the only willing purchaser—the government.
B.  Strict Abatement of Public Nuisances
As under Florida’s framework before Kelo, a local government may
still use its police powers to abate or eliminate public nuisances.173
Without being able to use the power of eminent domain to abate or
eliminate public nuisances,  a local government will aggressively174
exercise its legitimate police powers to do so. Those legitimate powers
deprive a property owner of any compensation for her loss. For example,
the government could cease the existing use and economic benefit of a
property by denying needed permits because of a perceived public
nuisance, such as noxious odors  or “incompatibility” with the175
surrounding area.  The government could also require a landowner to176
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that the city had the authority to determine that the proposed development would have been
incompatible with the surrounding uses, creating a safety hazard that would constitute a public
nuisance. Id. at 639; see also Test v. Broward County, 616 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
(validating the city’s condemnation of residential properties as a “public use” because the
properties’ use rendered them public nuisances in light of their incompatibility with a nearby
airport).
177. See infra notes 178–84 and accompanying text; see also FLA. STAT. § 60.05(2) (2007)
(“[T]he court . . . may enjoin: (a) The maintaining of a nuisance; (b) The operating and maintaining
of the place or premises where the nuisance is maintained; . . . (d) The conduct, operation, or
maintenance of any business or activity operated or maintained . . . on the premises in connection
with or incident to . . . the nuisance.”).
178. 801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001).
179. Id. at 867, 876.
180. Id. at 867–68.
181. Id. at 868.
182. Id. at 875–76.
183. See, e.g., Kyong-Ja v. City of Tampa, No. 98-0091, 1999 WL 33756531, at *1–2 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. May 12, 1999) (upholding fines and the closure of Kyong-Ja’s motel for one year because
numerous drug-related violations at the motel had rendered the property a public nuisance and
“[t]he direct closure of businesses by nuisance abatement boards . . . have been upheld by the courts
of this state”); Ellana v. City of Tampa, No. 97-3911, 1997 WL 33644726, at *1–2 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 15, 1997) (upholding a one-year closure of Billy’s Market by deferring to the City of Tampa
Nuisance Abatement Board’s determination that numerous drug-related violations constituted a
public nuisance).
184. See Keshbro, 801 So. 2d at 876–77. In Keshbro, the Florida Supreme Court held that the
City of St. Petersburg’s order to close an apartment complex for one year constituted a taking
because “there was no extensive record indicating that the drug activity had become an inseparable
part of the operation of the apartment complex.” Id. at 868, 877.
abate a nuisance or order the temporary closure of his property for failing
to abate a nuisance.  177
In Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami,  the Florida Supreme Court upheld178
an order to temporarily close the Stardust Motel.  Over five years, the179
City of Miami Nuisance Abatement Board had issued orders closing the
entire motel for a one-year period, a portion of the motel for six months,
and finally the entire motel for six months, due to multiple reported
incidents of drug activity and prostitution.  After the board issued the last180
order, the motel owner claimed that the temporary closure constituted a
taking.  Although finding that the closure deprived the owner of all181
economically beneficial use of his property, the court held that the
government had lawfully issued the closure to abate a public nuisance that
was “inextricably intertwined” with the motel’s operation.  182
Since Keshbro, state circuit courts have upheld fines and one-year
closures of properties where numerous drug-related violations have
occurred.  Seemingly, as long as records indicate a persistent public183
nuisance, like drug activity, a municipality may temporarily close one’s
property without providing any compensation.  It would be unreasonable184
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185. See id. at 875 (citing City of Miami v. Keshbro, Inc., 717 So. 2d 601, 604 n.7 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1998), aff’d, 801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001)).
186. 857 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
187. Id. at 327.
188. Id. at 327–28. Fortunately for the Powells, they had not been afforded the opportunity to
abate the nuisance, so the action could not proceed. Id. at 328.
189. See id. at 328 (Villanti, J., concurring).
190. See City of Jacksonville v. Sohn, 616 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (noting that
the city could enter the plaintiff’s land to abate a public nuisance pursuant to the city’s ordinance);
City of Venice v. Valente, 429 So. 2d 1241, 1242, 1244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (holding constitutional
an ordinance establishing the conditions that render a building unsafe and thus a public nuisance,
and providing for the repair or demolition of such buildings at the landowner’s expense).
191. Sohn, 616 So. 2d at 1174 (holding that nuisance abatement liens may not be enforced
against owners personally but may be enforced against the subject property); see also FLA. STAT.
§ 173.02 (2007).
192. See Massey v. Charlotte County, 842 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). In Massey, the
plaintiffs failed to obtain the appropriate permits before constructing improvements on their
property. Id. at 143. After a hearing, the Charlotte County Code Enforcement Board entered an
order finding the plaintiffs in violation of the building code, requiring them to comply within thirty
days, and warning them that a fine would be imposed for failure to comply. Id. at 143–44. Although
the order also indicated that a fine could become a lien on the property, the court held that the lien
imposed on the plaintiffs’ property after they failed to comply violated procedural due process. Id.
at 144, 147. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs were not given any notice or opportunity to
contest the validity of the fines or the lien before the board imposed them on the plaintiffs. Id.
While the court quashed the lien order in this case, it did not find facially unconstitutional Florida
Statutes § 162.09, which the board used to impose the lien on the plaintiffs. Id. at 145.
after such a temporary closure to expect the landowner to transform the
property for another use during that period.  Thus, a closure deprives the185
landowner of any beneficial use of that property for the government-
determined period. 
Significantly, Florida case law also suggests that the government may
contribute to rendering a property a public nuisance. In Powell v. City of
Sarasota,  police conducted “controlled buys” of narcotics from a tenant186
on the Powells’ residential rental property and later brought a nuisance
abatement action against them because of the drug activity.  While the187
Powells ultimately prevailed, the majority noted that the action could have
proceeded if the Powells had been given an adequate opportunity to abate
the nuisance and had failed to take adequate measures to do so.  It was188
seemingly irrelevant that no evidence indicated that the Powells’ property
was a public nuisance before the police operations.189
If the landowner does not take the requested measures to abate the
nuisance, a local government may undertake the necessary measures.190
Then, the government may impose a lien or special tax on the property for
the costs incurred and may enforce the nuisance abatement lien against the
property.  Of course, in imposing the lien, the local government must191
afford the landowner procedural due process.192
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193. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.190(b)(3); see also Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d
523, 530 (Fla. 1995) (discussing circuit court review of local administrative action under Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(3)).
194. See Haines City Cmty. Dev., 658 So. 2d at 530.
195. See FLA. STAT. § 45.031 (2007).
196. Where the landowner voluntarily sells to the government, the government may turn the
property over to a private entity as long as the proposed project fits within a broad definition of
“public use.” See, e.g., State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 891 (Fla.
1980) (holding that the city’s redevelopment agency could issue bonds to purchase property in a
“blighted” area because the proposed redevelopment would be for a public purpose). Where the
property is foreclosed and a judicial sale takes place, any person may bid for the property at the
public auction. See FLA. STAT. § 45.031.
197. See supra note 22.
198. Majors, supra note 74 (quoting Florida Representative Bill Galvano, a member of the
House Select Committee to Protect Private Property Rights).
Significantly, reviewing courts consider the administrative decisions
of bodies like public-nuisance abatement boards without reweighing the
evidence.  In fact, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the193
administrative body unless the court determines that procedural due
process was not given, that the essential requirements of law were not
observed, or that the administrative body’s findings were not supported by
competent substantial evidence.  This judicial deference gives local194
governments wide latitude to compel a landowner to abate what the
government deems a public nuisance.
Whereas property seized by eminent domain results in compensation
for the landowner, property “seized” by increased taxation, regulation, or
enforcement of public nuisances results in no compensation for the
landowner or perhaps in an elimination of all viable use (from the
landowner’s perspective). The government may use these legitimate police
powers to coerce a landowner to sell or may foreclose on the property and
sell it at a public auction.  In either case, a private entity could obtain the195
property.196
C.  Shift of Potential Corruption to the State Legislature
With the approval of a three-fifths majority of both houses, the Florida
Legislature may create exceptions to the prohibition on private-to-private
transfers.  This three-fifths-majority requirement was put in place197
supposedly to ensure that “‘future Legislatures can’t go back and change
[eminent domain regulation].’”  Although the requirement offers some198
protection, it also opens up an avenue for abuse by merely shifting the risk
of “corruption” from local governments to the state legislature. Indeed, the
Florida Legislature is no more immune from special-interest groups or
political pressure than local governments; thus, strongly supported
projects, such as those backed by the governor, could get approval.
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199. Scott Barancik, Bush Family Friend Takes Lead on Scripps, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan.
20, 2004, at 1A.
200. Id.
201. Deana Poole & Connie Piloto, Scripps Hopefuls Detail Visions to Entice Institute, PALM
BEACH POST, July 29, 2004, at 1A.
202. See Hector Florin, Targeting Land for Biotech Wins Nod from Panel, PALM BEACH POST,
July 15, 2006, at 1B; Charles Pattison, End Uncertainty by Relocating Scripps, TAMPA TRIB., Oct.
7, 2005, at 17.
203. See S.V. Date, Proposal Would Allow Mecca Construction Despite Lawsuits, PALM
BEACH POST, Apr. 29, 2005, at 12A; Neil Santaniello & Cadence Mertz, Bill Prevents Scripps
“Doomsday,” S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL, Apr. 29, 2005, at 1B.
204. See Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21 (2006)
(noting that contemporary courts view “the holdout problem as a major, if not the ‘principal,’
For example, former Florida Governor Jeb Bush was determined to lure
biotechnology development to Florida.  In 2004, using the influence of199
$369 million in state money, the esteemed law firm Broad and Cassel, and
former University of Florida President Marshall Criser, Jr., Jeb Bush
convinced Scripps Research Institute to locate in Florida.  One of the200
sites that Scripps considered for its research complex was at Mecca Farms
in Riviera Beach, which would have required condemning hundreds of
homes and businesses.  Ultimately, because of environmental concerns201
with the location, Scripps decided to locate on government-donated land
elsewhere;  thus, eminent domain never became an issue. However, the202
political will behind the Scripps project was demonstrated by the
governor’s strong push for the legislature to pass a bill that would have
prevented a court-ordered demolition of the research facilities had
environmentalists successfully challenged the construction at Mecca
Farms.203
The Scripps facility exemplifies the type of project for which the
Florida Legislature, compelled by political support, would likely make an
exception. This is not to say that allowing these types of projects is wrong;
after all, the government would be weighing the inconvenience to
individual property owners against tremendous public good that
biotechnology would bring to Florida. Still, Florida’s recent eminent
domain reform might permit large state-backed projects to proceed with
the help of eminent domain, while small local projects would be barred for
lack of statewide support.
D.  Increased Costs to the Taxpayers from Holdouts
Florida’s new eminent domain framework will foster a holdout
problem that will ultimately cause land acquisition costs to be passed on
to the taxpayers. A landowner’s holdout power has long justified the use
of eminent domain.  Absent eminent domain, a landowner has the204
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justification for” eminent domain). Despite the holdout problem, Posner believes that the
government should be required to buy property on the open market. Posting of Richard Posner,
supra note 96.
205. Posting of Richard Posner, supra note 96.
206. Id.
207. Id.; see, e.g., Merrill, supra note 123, at 75 (arguing that the costs of acquiring the parcels
needed to construct an underground pipeline to transport crude oil from a producing field to a far-
away refinery might be prohibitively expensive without eminent domain because landowners may
choose to hold out). Posner also explains the usefulness of eminent domain when a developer needs
to acquire many separately owned contiguous parcels for a project. Posting of Richard Posner,
supra note 96. Indeed, a government unable to use eminent domain for economic development
“would be forced to pay buyers exorbitant amounts to acquire property.” See Jarosz, supra note 34,
at 39 (citing David Barron, a professor at Harvard Law School).
208. See Posting of Richard Posner, supra note 96.
209. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 534–35 (discussing the effects of the market for property on
holdout incentives). A property’s market may also become thin after the government has acquired
almost all of the parcels needed for the proposed project except the holdout landowners. See Lee
Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 971–72.
210. Cohen, supra note 1, at 535. The procedures required to exercise eminent domain make
it more expensive in a thick market. Merrill, supra note 123, at 77–78. Due process costs include
“obtaining legislative authority, drafting and filing the complaint, serving process, securing a
formal appraisal, the possibility of a trial and appeal.” Id. at 77. Moreover, in a thick market, the
government may simply buy a different parcel of land rather than pay the holdout’s demanded
premium. See Fennell, supra note 209, at 972.
211. Cohen, supra note 1, at 534–35. Merrill suggests that the government should be required
to use the market where there exists such a functioning market for a resource, but eminent domain
should be permitted when barriers to market exchange exist. Merrill, supra note 123, at 74.
212. See Kelly, supra note 204, at 21 (noting that owners would not have the incentive or
ability to hold out if they were unaware that their property was being purchased for a large project);
incentive to “hold out” for an exorbitant price when the government
wishes to acquire his land.  To illustrate this incentive, Richard Posner205
gives the example of a railroad or pipeline company purchasing right-of-
way easements to provide service between two points.  Without eminent206
domain, each intervening landowner has the power to demand a premium
because all other easements that the company has purchased will be
worthless without his as well.  Thus, Posner concludes that “a flat rule207
against takings in which the land ends up in the hands of private
companies would . . . be unsound.”  208
Competition can combat the holdout problem in a “thick” market
(where there are many available alternatives to a particular property), but
the problem is more difficult in a “thin” market (where the property for the
proposed project is scarce or uniquely suited for the project).  In fact, in209
a thick market, purchasing property on the open market is less expensive
than acquiring it through eminent domain because of the requisite
procedures for takings.  When a landowner knows that the market is thin210
for his property, however, he will hold out for a premium,  especially211
when a purchaser, like the government, has deep pockets.  212
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see also Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1969, 1976–77 (1987) (arguing that holdout problems that arise when a seller knows of a
buyer’s deep pockets could be overcome by permitting principals to conceal their existence).
213. Merrill, supra note 123, at 75. To combat holdouts, many developers use “pre-
commitment” contracts, whereby the developer promises to pay all potential sellers in a targeted
area the same price. Cohen, supra note 1, at 568. This allows the developer to legitimately argue
that he cannot pay the holdouts’ substantially higher price because it would result in an obligation
to raise every other landowner’s price, thus preventing the project altogether. Id. Still, Cohen
admits that those landowners who are not strategically, but sincerely, holding out, will not be
affected by this strategy. Id.
214. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
215. Generally, a public nuisance is something that annoys the community or poses harm to
the public health. Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1036 (Fla. 2001); see also 58 AM. JUR.
2D Nuisances § 34 (2007) (defining a “public nuisance” as, among other things, “behavior which
unreasonably interferes with the health [and] safety” and “whatever tends to endanger life or
generate disease and affects the health of the community” (footnotes omitted)).
216. See supra notes 74–80 and accompanying text.
217. See Castle Coal., About Us, http://www.castlecoalition.org/profile/index.html (last visited
Feb. 10, 2008); Castle Coal., Model Language for State Statutes Limiting Eminent Domain Abuse,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=310&Itemid=117
(last visited Feb. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Castle Coal., Model Language] (limiting eminent domain
On a large scale, with each landowner demanding a premium, costs for
the proposed project can become prohibitively expensive.  If the project213
does not proceed, the community loses out on a project that the
government believed would benefit the community. If the project does
proceed, the community taxpayers ultimately bear the significantly higher
cost of assembling the needed parcels.
V.  SOLUTIONS TO REACH A DESIRABLE RESULT
A.  Eliminate the Public-Nuisance Prohibition and
                 Strengthen Criteria            
In prohibiting eminent domain to abate or eliminate public nuisances,214
the Florida Legislature took a valuable tool away from municipalities to
clean up truly “contaminated” or “crime-infested” areas, which constitute
traditional public nuisances.  The legislature should allow the215
government to use eminent domain to abate or eliminate those public
nuisances that pose existing threats to the public health and safety. In fact,
this was the effect of the bill that the House Select Committee to Protect
Private Property Rights approved and that remained in the proposed
legislation until the bill was amended two days prior to its passage.216
Additionally, the Castle Coalition, a nationwide grassroots property rights
and protection initiative started by the Institute for Justice, adopts this
approach in its model legislation.  Thus, including such a provision217
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to when it is necessary for a public use and defining “public use” as removal of a public nuisance
or elimination of a direct threat to public health or safety).
218. Despite the fact that the Castle Coalition’s model legislation permits eminent domain to
eliminate public nuisances, it still champions Florida’s reform as “a model for other state
legislatures.” See CASTLE COAL., supra note 17, at 4.
219. See, e.g., supra Part IV.B (discussing how “noxious odors” or “incompatibility with the
surrounding area” can constitute public nuisances and noting the great judicial deference to local
governments’ determinations of a public nuisance).
220. This would not be an effort to enumerate all nuisances but rather to determine which
conditions would warrant using eminent domain to abate or eliminate the nuisance. See Orlando
Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. 1972) (“It has been said that
an attempt to enumerate all nuisances would be almost the equivalent as an attempt to classify the
infinite variety of ways in which one may be annoyed or impeded in the enjoyment of his rights.”).
221. The House Select Committee to Protect Private Property Rights intended the Florida
Legislature to provide specific guidelines. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
222. See Castle Coal., Model Language, supra note 217.
223. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
224. Even when eminent domain was available for non-traditional takings, the government
usually attempted to purchase the property before exercising the power. See supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 99, 205, 211–13.
226. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
probably would not draw much criticism from private-property rights
supporters.  218
Still, the Florida Legislature may fear that local governments would
abuse the power to classify certain activities as “public nuisances.”219
Accordingly, the legislature should strengthen the criteria that classify a
public nuisance for eminent domain purposes.  For example, the220
legislature could adopt specific guidelines for when a property’s condition
threatens health and safety.  This approach, which was also adopted by221
the Castle Coalition’s model legislation,  would look something like the222
proposed revised legislation in this Note’s Appendix when incorporated
into Florida’s existing framework. Such rigid guidelines would accomplish
the legislature’s goal of curbing eminent domain abuse while giving local
governments the freedom to take measures to protect their citizens.
B.  Allow “Beneficial Takings” but Require Sufficient
      Compensation    
Prohibiting all private-to-private transfers prevents “beneficial takings”
to establish not-for-profit hospitals, museums, or sports complexes.223
Although the government should attempt to obtain voluntary transfers
from landowners,  any holdouts will very likely prevent the project from224
proceeding because of the prohibitive expense.  On the other hand, the225
government may decide to operate the facility itself.226
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227. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
228. Of course, this solution assumes that such “blanket” authorizations for beneficial takings
would be permitted by the Florida Constitution. See supra Part III.C.
229. Cohen, supra note 1, at 566. Cohen proposed the following constitutional amendment:
The State or its subdivisions shall not exercise the power of eminent domain
for the purpose of acquiring property that will be transferred to a non-
governmental entity or individual. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the
State or its political subdivisions may exercise the power of eminent domain for
the purpose of acquiring property that will be transferred to and used as the site
for a not-for-profit museum, public performing arts center or other cultural venue,
stadium, sports arena, or hospital. Should it become desirable to exercise the
power of eminent domain to acquire property that will be transferred to and
become the site of a type of not-for-profit entity not enumerated in this provision,
the State or the relevant subdivision shall do so only upon a majority vote of the
people held at public referendum. However, a public referendum may not
authorize the use of the power of eminent domain to transfer property to any
business or other organization operated for profit or to any individual.
Id. at 566–67.
230. See supra note 229.
231. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and
Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 139–40 (2004) (noting that compensation
at a premium is not a “radical idea,” because this used to be the rule in the United Kingdom and
is still the rule in Canada).
232. Cohen, supra note 1, at 537.
233. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (quoting United States
v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)).
However, the Florida Legislature may fear that blanket permission to
engage in “beneficial takings” would open the door for local governments
to abuse this classification. Indeed, the House Select Committee to Protect
Private Property Rights and the Florida Legislature intended to prevent
abuses of eminent domain resulting in private benefit at the public’s
expense.  Accordingly, the legislature could enact measures to227
discourage the takings or make such takings a limited exception to the
prohibition on private-to-private transfers.  For example, the legislature228
could require local voter approval for such projects or could require that
the facility not be operated for profit.  The legislature could also229
enumerate specific types of facilities that might qualify for a “beneficial
taking,” including hospitals and museums.230
Further, to discourage takings except when exceptionally beneficial, the
legislature could increase the compensation to landowners for these
takings.  There is ample support for the view that the constitutionally231
mandated “just compensation” requirement is undercompensatory.232
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court’s “fair market value” (i.e., “‘what a
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller’ at the time of the
taking” ) is inappropriate on its face because the owners of condemned233
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234. Cohen, supra note 1, at 537.
235. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (4th ed. 1992) (“The simplest
economic explanation for the requirement of just compensation is that it prevents the government
from overusing the taking power.”); see also Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and
Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1999) (“[T]he obligation to pay
compensation can constrain government inclinations to exploit politically vulnerable groups and
individuals.”).
236. Essentially, like the “just compensation” requirement, this premium requirement would
force the government to consider whether the proposed project will produce more value in the
property than the amount of compensation required to obtain that property. Cohen, supra note 1,
at 541–42.
237. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 231, at 140 (arguing that a court should base
its decision whether to award heightened compensation on the availability of similar property in
the same community). 
238. Posting of Gary Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2005/06/index.html (June 27, 2005, 07:35 EST) (asking why a landowner should
be “forced to sell at a price that could be way below its full value to her?”); Posting of Richard
Posner, supra note 96 (recognizing that “a particular parcel in the hands of a particular owner will
generally yield him an idiosyncratic value that is on top of the market value”).
239. Posting of Richard Posner, supra note 96 (“Generally, property is worth more to the
owner than the market price . . . because it fits his tastes or needs best as a consequence of its
location or improvements . . . or because relocation costs would be high.”); see also Cohen, supra
note 1, at 538 (arguing that the “subjective premium” an owner places on his property “may include
sentimental attachment, unique suitability of the property to the owner’s needs, relocation costs,
replacement costs of the land and improvements, consequential damages to retained property,
attorneys’ fees, lost business revenue, goodwill or going-concern value, and the aggravation of
having to move”).
240. Merrill, supra note 123, at 64.
241. See Michael Debow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C.
L. REV. 579, 580, 580 n.8, 588 (1995) (discussing the criticism of unjust compensation).
land are not willing sellers.  Like the “just compensation” requirement234
that discourages the government from abusing or overusing eminent
domain,  compensation at a premium would lead to a more trustworthy235
use of “beneficial takings.”236
Moreover, increased compensation would recognize that specific
takings can result in losses greater than the property’s fair market value.237
Landowners often subjectively value their property more highly than the
objective government assessment.  For example, a landowner’s238
subjective value could encompass factors such as his preferences, the
unique suitability of the property to his needs, relocation costs, attorneys’
fees, and lost business revenue.239
Overall, increased compensation may make landowners more
indifferent to the loss of their property.  Indeed, a large factor in the240
public call for eminent domain reform stemmed from the feeling that
condemnees were being “unjustly compensated.”  Thus, the Florida241
Legislature might define “just compensation” for beneficial takings to
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242. In Illinois, the state’s eminent domain system was reformed to provide greater rights to
property owners, including compensation for a landowner’s relocation costs. See Jarosz, supra note
34, at 37.
243. However, some argue that overcompensating a landowner is also dangerous. See Cohen,
supra note 1, at 557 (“Overly generous awards may lead to inefficient overinvestment by property
owners.”); Fennell, supra note 209, at 993, 993 n.118 (arguing that overgenerous awards for
eminent domain could lead to “perverse incentives,” including overinvestment in the property);
Merrill, supra note 123, at 92 (arguing that property owners would have an incentive to increase
their chances of condemnation).
244. See FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (2007).
245. See supra notes 238–39 and accompanying text (discussing possible factors that may be
included in an owner’s “subjective premium”).
246. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979). Indeed, the Court
settled on fair market value merely because it was the most practical measure of compensation.
Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 231, at 139 n.265 (noting that the Court in 564.54 Acres
of Land adopted the fair market value standard for just compensation because of the Court’s desire
for a working rule, considering the difficulties in assessing the actual value of condemned
property).
247. See supra Part III.C.
248. See supra Part III.C.
249. See supra note 22.
250. This measure would be necessary because the constitutional language supersedes any
statutory enactment. See supra note 108.
include relocation costs  or might give landowners a percentage over fair242
market value for a taking.  Florida already requires the government to243
pay the condemnee’s attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in defending an
eminent domain action.  Of course, it is impossible to precisely244
compensate an owner for his subjective value,  but these “practical245
difficulties in assessing the worth an individual places on particular
property”  do not have to stand in the way of increasing compensation for246
beneficial takings.
C.  Eliminate the Ambiguity in the Florida Constitution
The ambiguity in the Florida Constitution  might be resolved by247
amending the Florida Statutes. As long as the constitution permits a
“blanket” authorization for certain types of transfers, the legislature could
amend the current statutes to provide for, among other things, transfers of
land taken by eminent domain to a private utility and from one private
utility to another.  Of course, this change would require at least a three-248
fifths approval from both houses of the legislature.  If a “blanket”249
authorization would not be constitutionally permissible, the legislature
would have to place a correcting amendment on the next election ballot.250
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251. See supra Part IV.
252. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting the expansive regulatory-takings
jurisprudence). But cf. Penalver, supra note 125 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should view
the Takings Clause more narrowly and not compensate landowners for regulations that could be
viewed as legitimate taxes). See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 295–303 (1985) (arguing that progressive income taxes should
qualify as unconstitutional takings); Kades, supra note 127 (proposing a principle “to draw the line
between permissible taxes and those that violate the Takings Clause,” and discussing existing
theories that distinguish taxes from takings).
253. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 1439.
254. See supra Part V.A. 
255. See supra Part V.B.
256. This is akin to the logical fallacy of a false dichotomy, where we are asked “to choose
between unrealistically polarized alternatives and thus to ignore the sensible analyses and policies
that usually lurk in the grey areas between black and white categories.” Paul H. Brietzke, New
Wrinkles in Law . . . and Economics, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 105, 127 (1997).
D.  Decrease Abuse of Police Power 
Without eminent domain, government officials who wish to force out
a landowner may resort to misusing their police powers, including
imposing excessive and targeted taxes or regulations and aggressively
pursuing public nuisances.  Many theories propose protective measures251
that would limit situations where such actions rise to the level of a
taking,  and states may impose tighter restrictions on the regulatory or252
taxing powers.  253
If such sweeping changes were to be made, however, the issue would
need to be carefully studied to provide a solution that would not upset
local governments’ police power discretion. A simpler solution is to give
local governments more freedom to remedy truly harmful conditions  and254
to provide great public benefits.  Allowing these actions would lessen the255
propensity of the government to fabricate a need to use its police powers
to “seize” property without compensation. 
VI.  CONCLUSION
The Florida Legislature should not have used the perceived
inadequacies of the old eminent domain system to rationalize a blanket
prohibition on eminent domain for most purposes.  Florida’s common256
law already indicated that a taking could not be justified by economic
redevelopment. The Florida Legislature’s reaction was overly broad,
ambiguous, and could ultimately leave owners of land that the government
wants to acquire worse off than under the previous system. Therefore, the
legislature should implement a revised eminent domain framework to
better serve the original purpose of eminent domain—to benefit the public
that the legislature serves.
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APPENDIX:  REVISED STATUTE *
FLORIDA STATUTES § 73.014:  TAKING PROPERTY TO ABATE
OR ELIMINATE A PUBLIC NUISANCE 
(1)(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter
provision, ordinance, statute, or special law, the state, any political
subdivision as defined in s. 1.01(8), or any other entity to which the power
of eminent domain is delegated may exercise the power of eminent domain
to take private property if it establishes by clear and convincing evidence
that the property constitutes a public nuisance. Property that constitutes
a public nuisance shall include only property that poses an existing threat
to public health and safety and is one of the following:**
1. A structure that, because it is dilapidated, unsanitary, unsafe, or
vermin-infested, has been designated by the agency responsible for
enforcement of the housing, building, or fire codes as unfit for human
habitation or use;
2. A structure that, in its current condition, is a fire hazard, or is otherwise
dangerous to the safety of persons or property;
3. A structure from which the utilities, plumbing, heating, sewerage, or
other facilities have been disconnected, destroyed, removed, or rendered
ineffective so that the property is unfit for its intended use;
4. A vacant or unimproved lot or parcel of ground in a predominantly
built-up neighborhood that, by reason of neglect or lack of maintenance,
has become a place for accumulation of trash and debris, or a haven for
rodents or other vermin;
5. A property that has tax delinquencies exceeding the value of the
property; 
6. A property with code violations affecting health or safety that has not
been substantially rehabilitated within one year of the receipt of notice to
rehabilitate from the appropriate code enforcement agency;
7. A property that, by reason of environmentally hazardous conditions,
solid-waste pollution, or contamination, poses a direct threat to public
health or safety in its present condition;
8. An abandoned property, defined as property not occupied by a person
with a legal or equitable right to occupy it and for which the condemning
authority is unable to identify and contact the owner despite making
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reasonable efforts or property that has been declared abandoned by the
owner, including an estate in possession of the property.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter
provision, ordinance, statute, or special law, abating or eliminating a
public nuisance in accordance with part (a) is a valid public purpose or
use for which private property may be taken by eminent domain and
satisfies the public purpose requirement of s. 6(a), Art. X of the State
Constitution.  
(c) This subsection does not diminish the power of counties or
municipalities to adopt or enforce county or municipal ordinances related
to code enforcement or the elimination of public nuisances, inclusive and
exclusive of those described in part (a), to the extent such ordinances to
abate public nuisances not described in part (a) do not authorize the
taking of private property by eminent domain.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any charter
provision, ordinance, statute, or special law, the state, any political
subdivision as defined in s. 1.01(8), or any other entity to which the power
of eminent domain is delegated may not exercise the power of eminent
domain to take private property for the purpose of preventing or
eliminating slum or blight conditions. Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, including any charter provision, ordinance, statute, or special law,
taking private property for the purpose of preventing or eliminating slum
or blight conditions is not a valid public purpose or use for which private
property may be taken by eminent domain and does not satisfy the public
purpose requirement of s. 6(a), Art. X of the State Constitution.
* Emphasis indicates additions or alterations to the current statute. 
** The enumerated conditions that render a property a threat to public
health and safety are adapted from the Castle Coalition’s model
legislation. See Castle Coal., Model Language for State Statutes Limiting
Eminent Domain Abuse, http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option
=com_content&task=view&id=310&Itemid=117 (last visited Feb. 10,
2008).
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